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"The English law of evidence, which is the child of the jury."
James Bradley Thayer
"The fallacy that whatever is morally convincing and whatever rea-
sonable beings would form their idgments and act upon, nay
be submitted to a jury."
Mr. Justice ColeridgeTHE Anglo-Saxon trial by ordeal and trial by compurgation and
the Anglo-Norman trial by battle were essentially adversary pro-
ceedings, conducted under public supervision, by which the liti-
gants appealed to the Deity for a decision. The institution of trial by
inquest or recognition, from which trial by jury soon evolved, not only
substituted a resort to reason for reliance on superstition, but also re-
moved the proceeding completely from the control of the adversaries.
It compelled them to submit to "the test of what a set of strangers might
say, witnesses selected by a public officer."' This set of strangers was
originally an investigative body chosen for the supposed capacity of its
members to answer the disputed question without help from the court
and without aid or hindrance from the parties. The parties were per-
mitted to state what they respectively asserted to be the facts. Later
they secured the privilege of presenting additional information through
witnesses. By the middle of the Sixteenth Century this had become a
common practice. The jury came to rely more and more upon what the
parties presented in open court and less and less upon what its individual
members knew or learned from other sources, so that at the beginning
of the Seventeenth Century Coke could truly say that "most commonly
juries are led by deposition of witnesses.' '2 Less than a century and a
half later it had become established that the jury must base its verdict
not upon the private knowledge or information of its members but solely
upon the evidence given in open court. 3 And this evidence was furnished
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'Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 56 (1898).
2 Coke, Third Institute 163 (ed. of 1817).
3 Wigmore, Evidence § 1364 (2d. ed. 1923).
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by the adversaries. Trial by jury had been transformed from an investi-
gative or inquisitorial to an adversary proceeding. Thus, the parties
furnish and control the material upon which the modern jury is required
to exercise its rational processes, just as in trial by compurgation, ordeal
and battle the parties furnished and controlled the material through which
the Divine judgment was made manifest.
In the operation of any system which undertakes to settle disputed
questions of fact by rational methods, there will inevitably be evolved
rules regulating the scope of permissible inquiry, the qualifications of the
persons to be heard and the kind of information to be gathered and con-
sidered. Among the factors which will most powerfully influence the
character and content of these rules one would expect to find not only
the competence or lack of competence of the tribunal upon which is
imposed the task of resolving the dispute, but also the means by which
and the extent to which sources of information are made available to it.
Since the adversary feature of our system is quite as distinctive as is its
use of a jury, it may be well not to accept without scrutiny the oft-
repeated statement that the jury is responsible for the origin and per-
sistence of our law of evidence. Particularly is caution needed when
declarations like that of Lord Coleridge in Wright v. Doe d. Tatham4 are
taken to mean that the jury is the sole or chief cause of all those rules
which require the rejection of logically relevant evidence.
Foremost among the exclusionary rules of the common law are those
which render certain persons incompetent to testify because of mental
deficiency, religion, interest, marital relationship and infamy. While it is
too obvious for comment that these disqualifications had and have no
basis in the adversary character of the proceeding, it also seems clear that
they are in no appreciable degree connected in origin or experience with
any supposed incapacity of a jury to evaluate the testimony of the dis-
qualified persons. Once the concept of mental derangement as a Divine
visitation was abandoned, the test of intellectual capacity to testify be-
came the capacity to perceive, remember and relate intelligently-a test
applicable to all rational investigations by any body, skilled or unskilled.
Similarly the disqualification of mental immaturity operated only where
it negatived that capacity, except in so far as it revealed inability to take
an oath understandingly. Religious qualifications also were insisted upon
only to the extent to which they affected ability and willingness to take a
binding oath. The oath-requirement was rigidly enforced in the forms
of trial which preceded the jury; and there is no reason to suppose that
4 5 CL & Fin. 670, 69o (H.L. 1838), quoted supra.
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its retention was due to any mistrust of the jury as a fact-finding tribunal.
The disqualification for interest, whatever its origin, is not peculiar to
the jury system, for, as Mr. Wigmore says, it "is found long established,
by adoption from the Roman law, in the ecclesiastical rules as practised
in England." S Infamy by conviction of crime, likewise, created incom-
petence under other systems, and it has been suggested that there is some-
thing generic and universal in the origin of this disqualification. In the
Roman and ecclesiastical law, too, is the concept that lies at the root of
the rule forbidding one spouse to be a witness for or against the other.
6
And the justification for such remnants of it as still persist, is put upon
grounds of policy which have no relation to the jury. For the harm done,
therefore, by the exclusion of relevant material on account of the com-
mon law rules governing competency of witnesses, the jury system cannot
be blamed.
The same is true as to that large body of evidence made unavailable
through the exercise of the common law privileges. Each rule of privilege
concededly authorizes the suppression of the truth and prevents the trier
of fact, whether judge or jury, from hearing pertinent testimony easy to
value by even the most unsophisticated. Almost every one of them rests
upon the gratuitous assumption that it furthers a supposedly sound social
policy. The privilege of one spouse to refuse to testify against the other
and to prevent the other from testifying against him has its basis in the
judicial desire to foster marital harmony. A similar policy accounts for
the privilege of a spouse that confidential communications between hus-
band and wife be not disclosed. The privilege against self-crimination has
a separate and distinct history, probably coming into the common law
as the result of resistance to ecclesiastical heresy hunts; 7 neither in origin
nor in subsequent history has it any connection with any assumed or
demonstrated inadequacy of the jury to handle the criminating material.
The privilege of a client that confidential communications between him-
self and his attorney shall not be disclosed began as the privilege of the
attorney that he should not be compelled to violate his honor as a gentle-
man by committing a breach of confidence. Its continued existence is
sought to be justified for reasons builded upon the postulate that skilled
assistance in the presentation of litigated cases is essential. If this is
sound, it is largely because our system is adversary from the inception of
an action to its termination. No doubt the existence of a mass of rules as
to the admissibility of evidence adds to the complexities of litigation, and
s x Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 575, P. 989.
6 Id. at § 6oo. 7 4 id. at § 2250.
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thus makes for the need of expert assistance.' But if the judge were under
the duty of excluding all objectionable evidence, aid of counsel would be
less imperative. However, under the adversary system the judge's duty
in this respect is merely to rule upon objections interposed by the adver-
sary. And much inadmissible evidence is made so for reasons that would
be equally applicable had jury trial never been instituted. Certainly no
one could seriously contend that state secrets and certain portions of
official documents are subject to exclusion because the jury is a part of
the trial tribunal.9 Consequently if our law of evidence had confined its
rejection of relevant evidence to that coming from incompetent witnesses
and that falling within the scope of the privileges, there could have been
little, if any, foundation for imputing its origin to the jury.
The rules which conditionally prefer one sort of evidence or one class
of witnesses over another do not in terms absolutely exclude relevant
evidence, but they sometimes reach that result when the conditions upon
which the preference may be avoided are not fulfilled by the proponent.
The requirement that a documentary original must be produced as evi-
dence of its content has its roots in the ancient substantive law, which
identified the legal consequences of a document with the document itself.
The method of trial, where the authenticity of the writing was in dispute,
was by deed witnesses before the court, and not by jury. As trial by jury
gradually displaced trial by documents, the requirement of profert in
pleading made mandatory the production of the original in court. So
long as pleadings were oral, there was in effect no difference between its
production and what, under later practice, would have been its introduc-
tion in evidence. By just what process, when oral pleadings disappeared,
the principle which had been enforced by profert made itself manifest in a
rule of evidence is not quite clear. But by the early Eighteenth Century,
it had happened. Chief Baron Gilbert's explanation is, generally
that a man must have the utmost evidence the nature of the fact is capable of; ....
less evidence doth create but opinion and surmise, and does not leave a man the entire
satisfaction that arises from demonstration; for if it be plainly seen in the nature of the
8 No doubt, too, the division of functions between judge and jury particularly as applied
to questions preliminary to the admissibility of evidence increases the complexities of the trial.
See Maguire and Epstein, Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining Admissibility of
Evidence, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 392 (1927); Morgan, Functions of judge and jury in the Deter-
mination of Preliminary Questions of Fact, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 165 (1929). The presence of the
jury obviously creates many problems of procedure throughout the trial.
9 An examination of the various subjects of privilege treated by Dean Wigmore in §§ 2210
to 2224 will disclose no influence of the jury system upon the rulings.
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transaction that there is some more evidence that doth not appear, the very not pro-
ducing it is a presumption that it would have detected something more than appears
already .... M
Specifically he says:
But deeds are only private evidences .... and therefore they must be produced in
evidence; for the law requires the best evidence that the nature of the thing is capable
of, and the deed is much better evidence than the copy of it, for the rasure and inter-
lineation that might vacate the deed, might appear in the deed itself, and the very
offering a copy carries a presumption, as if the original were defective .... 1
Though this reasoning leaves much to be desired, and the danger of honest
mistake in recollection or transcription is equally important, a combina-
tion of these considerations furnishes a justification for the retention of
the doctrine; and this notwithstanding the fact that it came into our law
in the historical evolution of quite a different concept.
The common law preference for the testimony of attesting witnesses
likewise finds its origin in days long antedating the jury; they are the
successors of "that very ancient class of transaction or business witnesses,
running far back into the old Germanic law, who were once the only sort
of witnesses that could be compelled to come before a court. 'x2 Persisting
through the evolution of trial by jury, this preference was sought to be
justified on such specious reasoning as that the parties had agreed or were
supposed to have agreed that the writing should not be given in evidence
without calling the attesting witness, or that the opponent is entitled to
have him produced for cross-examination concerning the circumstances of
the execution of the instrument. There is not the slightest suggestion,
it will be noted, that the rule is in any degree attributable to the existence
of the jury. As in Chief Baron Gilbert's exposition of the preference for
the original document, here too the central theme is the obligation of the
proponent to produce the best he has, so that it may be scrutinized by the
adversary and its weaknesses exposed to the trier. Indeed Mr. Wigmore
believes that whatever justification such a rule may have is that it tends
to insure "a supply of trustworthy testimony which otherwise the parti-
san interests of either side might fail to furnish."' In other words, these
rules of preference are merely a salutary modification of the adversary's
control over the course of litigation.
The so-called opinion rule, in so far as it relates to the conditions upon
ro Gilbert, Evidence 4 (ed. of 176o). (Written before 1726.)
11 Id. at 96. Thayer, op. cit. supra note i, at 502.
23 2 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 1286, p. 937.
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which expert testimony is received, can hardly be said to operate to ex-
clude pertinent evidence. The reception of expert aid by the court is
found in the Year Books and other early reports. Its use as an aid to the
jury was early established. The silly refinements engrafted upon it in
some of our states are quite as much a reflection upon the intelligence of
judges as an imputation of incapacity to jurors. They do not obtain in
England; and with us they are usually applied to trials by the court as well
as to trials by jury. The rule excluding lay opinion, however, often results
in depriving court and jury of valuable information. Of course, no intelli-
gent trier of fact needs the aid of an unskilled witness in drawing infer-
ences from evidence properly in the case. Equally true is it that the princi-
ple underlying the hearsay rule makes unacceptable the beliefs, impres-
sions and deductions of a lay witness concerning material matter learned
from others. But in many instances testimony in the form of beliefs,
impressions and deductions is merely an expression of relevant personal
experiences of the witness. To reject it is to insist upon form of statement
at the expense of substance, and to accept a doctrine which originated half
a century after jury trial in its present form had come to maturity, a
doctrine, moreover, which has not "obtained orthodox standing in the
original home of our jurisprudence."' 4 It can, therefore, safely be asserted
that there is no objectionable feature of the opinion rule which considera-
tions looking to the protection of the jury can be relied upon to explain
or justify.
The history of the hearsay rule, the reasons assigned for its application
and the judicial explanations for limitations upon it may throw light
upon the causes for its creation and persistence. There can be no question
that during the first few centuries of the existence of the jury, it could
properly base its decision on information received otherwise than in open
court. It was very early recognized that jurors might properly answer as
the result of data obtained "through the words of their fathers and
through such words of other persons whom they are bound to trust as
worthy.' '5 During the Sixteenth Century hearsay from witnesses was
freely received. Towards the end of that century there were numerous
objections raised, but many, if not most, of them went to the weight of
hearsay rather than to its admissibility; and there was discussion looking
toward the establishment of something akin to the numerical system of
the civil law. By the middle of the Seventeenth Century the objections
144 id. at § 1917, P. io8.
is Brunner, The Origin of Jury Courts 427, 452 (1872), as quoted in 3 Wigmore, op. cit.
supra note 3, at § 1364, p. io.
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grew in number and force, and in its last quarter became effective to
cause the rejection of hearsay in the usual case, although it continued
to be received in corroboration of other evidence at least during the first
quarter of the Eighteenth Century. The grounds of rejection are thus
put by Chief Baron Gilbert:
The attestation of the witness must be to what he knows, not to that only which
he hath heard, for mere hearsay is no evidence; for it is his knowledge which must
direct the Court and Jury in the judgment of the fact, and not his mere credulity.
.... Besides though a person testify to what he hath heard upon oath, yet the person
who spake it was not upon oath; and if a man had been in Court and said the same
thing and had not sworn it, he had not been believed in a court of justice ..... x6
But as early as 1668 a hearsay sworn statement was rejected because
"the other party could not cross-examine the party sworn, which is the
common course";17 and in 1696 sworn depositions of a witness since de-
ceased were excluded by the King's Bench:
The Court sent the puisne judge to confer with the Justices of the Common Pleas;
who returning, the Chief Justice declared, that it was the opinion of both Courts that
these depositions should not be given in evidence, the defendant not being present
when they were taken before the mayor, and so had lost the benefit of a cross-exami-
nation."8
Before the opening of the Eighteenth Century, then, we find expressed
the two reasons still most frequently put forward for the rejection of
hearsay-lack of oath and lack of opportunity for cross-examination. It
is now established that sworn hearsay is inadmissible; it is very probably
true that cross-examined hearsay not given under oath is likewise subject
to exclusion; and there is some authority for the proposition that hearsay
given under oath and subject to cross-examination other than in a formal
proceeding should be rejected.9 In the modern cases the emphasis is so
heavily placed upon the opportunity to cross-examine that Mr. Wigmore
states the gist of the hearsay rule to be that it "prohibits the use of a
person's assertion as equivalent to testimony to the fact asserted unless
the asserter is brought to testify in court on the stand, where he may be
probed and cross-examined as to the grounds of his assertion and his
qualifications to make it.
''2°
In so far as the oath or its equivalent is a prerequisite to admissibility
of testimony, neither its history nor its employment in modern litigation.
6 Gilbert, op. cit. supra note io, at 152.
'7 2 Rolle's Abr. 679, pl. 9 (668).
is Rex v. Paine, 5 Mod. x63, 165 (696).
19 See Deering v. Schreyer, 88 App. Div. 457, 85 N.Y. S. 275 (1903).
203 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 5364, p. 9.
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furnishes any basis for any reasonable contention that it is imposed for
the peculiar benefit of the jury. It is merely a means of assuring the trier
or investigator that the witness is under a realization of his obligation
to tell the truth. As to cross-examination, there can be no doubt that
when properly used, it is a most effective instrument for the discovery of
the facts so far as they are within the ability of the witness to disclose.
And it might well be argued that in view of the defective powers of per-
ception, memory and narration of the ordinary witness and his weaknesses
or worse as regards veracity, the unskilled jury ought not to be permitted
to rely upon his uncross-examined testimony. If such were the rule, there
could then be little doubt of its intimate connection with the jury, and
there would be little reason for applying it in trials by the judge. But it
is not, and never has been the rule. It has never been suggested that the
adversary is under any obligation to cross-examine any witness; and it is
equally well settled that the judge is under no duty to do so. Indeed, in
most American jurisdictions, cross-examination by the judge is a pre-
carious proceeding, for he may commit the awful sin of indicating to the
jury his opinion upon the facts.21 Since no official cross-examiner is pro-
vided, the jury may have to come to its decision upon testimony which
has not been purified (or poisoned) by cross-examination. But the ad-
versary cannot be deprived of his right to cross-examine. There are a
few English cases in chancery which admit testimony given under oath
in open court against a party who without fault of his own or of his adver-
sary has been prevented from cross-examining. The accepted doctrine
in this country, however, requires the court on motion of the adversary
to strike direct testimony where without his fault or acquiescence he has
not been given the opportunity to cross-examine.22 And it seems a reason-
able deduction from the authorities that this right of a party could not be
denied merely because of a searching cross-examination conducted by the
judge. Furthermore, denial of the right to cross-examine is equally fatal
in a case tried without a jury, whether it be one in which the jury is
waived or one in which there is no right to trial by jury.2 3 It is, therefore,
suggested that had the Normans abolished the Anglo-Saxon forms of trial
a, This indicates the extent to which our courts have gone in preventing the jury from
receiving aid to which the adversary objects.
- See e.g., People v. Cole, 43 N.Y. 508 (1871).
23 It is true that the court receives uncross-examined sworn testimony in interlocutory
proceedings, and there is a conflict as to the applicability of the rules of evidence to hearings
by the judge upon matters preliminary to the admissibility of evidence. See Maguire and
Epstein, Rules of Evidence in Preliminary Controversies as to Admissibility, 36 Yale L.J.
1101 (1927).
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and replaced them with trial by any body of skilled triers, such as judges
or other expert investigators, and had the parties succeeded, by the proc-
ess of securing and enlarging the privilege of submitting evidence, in
changing the trial from an investigative to an adversary proceeding, a
rule forbidding the reception of hearsay would have developed. The right
of a party to cross-examine is an essential element of an adversary system;
it is not a necessary concomitant of trial by jury. It may be true that non-
jury systems have not created a hearsay rule; but that has no compelling
significance so long as they have not adopted an adversary theory of
litigation. And it is little more than speculation to intimate that a non-
jury substitute for the earlier forms of trial in England would not have
evolved into an adversary proceeding. Certainly there is little or nothing
in the reports of judicial proceedings to justify, much less to force, the
inference that the jury is responsible for its own transformation from an
investigative body acting upon information gathered from all available
and reliable sources into a tribunal compelled to rely principally, if not
entirely, upon materials furnished by the adversaries.
In judicial discussions dealing with accepted or proposed exceptions
to the hearsay rule there is much to be found indicating a distrust of the
jury's capacity to handle such hearsay as does not carry some warranty
of verity.24 It must, therefore, be conceded that in framing some parts of
the law governing hearsay the courts have been consciously influenced
by the fact that the tribunal to which the evidence is addressed is the jury.
This is not so manifest in the earlier decisions, wherein the chief argument
for admissibility is necessity; the witness could have testified if present;
since he is dead, his hearsay statement is the best evidence available.
But then the exceptions were few; now they are numerous. An examina-
tion of Mr. Wigmore's treatise will reveal at least eighteen different classes
of hearsay for the reception of each of which respectable authority may
be found.2 S In most of these Mr. Wigmore finds some guaranty of trust-
worthiness; but in many of them it is tenuous even in general theory and
practically non-existent in specific application. In fact the body of the
24 But even so, if the hearsay is received without objection by the adversary the jury may
by the majority view use it and base a verdict upon it. See Barlow v. Verrill, 183 Atl. 857
(N.H. 1936), annotated in 104 A.L.R. 1130 (1936).
25 Reported Testimony, Personal Admissions, Vicarious Admissions, Declarations against
Interest, Official Written Statements, Business Entries, Subscribing Witnesses, Pedigree,
Reputation, Ancient Documents, Declarations as to Boundaries, Dying Declarations, Declara-
tions of Mental Condition, Spontaneous Declarations, Contemporaneous Declarations, Narra-
tives of Testators, Voters' Statements, Commercial Lists, Learned Treatises;--these titles
suggest the classes, though Mr. Wigmore does not classify Reported Testimony as hearsay.
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exceptions can be explained only as the resultant of conflicting considera-
tions. Without going into detail, .it will suffice to point out that the re-
ception of admissions and the rejection of much reported testimony rest
only upon the adversary theory of litigation. Extra-judicial statements of
a party to the action are admitted against him although he is incompetent
as a witness in the case 26 and although he was without personal knowledge
of the matter asserted and was expressing a self-serving deduction from
inadmissible hearsay.2 7 On the other hand relevant testimony given in a
prior action by a competent witness under oath and then cross-examined
is rejected when offered against a party who had no opportunity to cross-
examine the witness when so testifying. Moreover it is, by the orthodox
rule, excluded even though the witness was actually cross-examined by
the party against whom it is offered, if it could not be received against
the party offering it.2 8 The doctrine of mutuality as applied here reflects
the notion of fair play between antagonists. In most of the exceptions,
however, the adversary theory is disregarded and the courts purport to
find some circumstance which serves as a substitute for an oath and thus
furnishes a so-called guaranty of trustworthiness. This usually means
nothing more than that an ordinary man in the situation of the declarant
would have desired to tell the truth, and, sometimes, merely that he would
have had no motive to falsify. At times a court will disregard both the
adversary and the trustworthiness theories and put the reception frankly
upon the ground that the evidence is needed and hearsay is better than
no evidence.29 Consequently it may be truly said that the jury is in part
responsible for a portion of the law creating and governing exceptions to
the hearsay rule, but certainly not for all of it.
Evidence which has only slight or remote probative value is ordinarily
not worth the time and expense involved in presenting and considering it
and should not be received by any trier, however great his powers of
discrimination. In two classes of cases exclusion is particularly desirable
when the trier is unskilled, namely, cases where this evidence will create
an unjustifiable prejudice, and those where it will confuse the issues.
Consequently, in such cases the courts are found basing their rulings of
26 See e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Potter, 6o Kan. 808, 58 Pac. 471
(1899).
27 See Reed v. McCord, 16o N.Y. 330, 54 N.E. 737 (1899); Cady v. Doxtator, 193 Mich.
170, 159 N.W. 151 (1916); Kaiser v. United States, 6o F. (2d) 410 (C.C.A. 8th 1932); Mayhew
v. Travelers' Protective Ass'n of America, 52 S.W. (2d) 29 (Mo.App. 1932).
28 See e.g., Metropolitan St.Ry.Co. v. Gumby, 99 Fed. 192 (C.C.A. 2d igoo).
29 See e.g., Mr. Justice Green in Railing v. Commonwealth, i1o Pa. oo, 1o5 (I885), speak-
ing of dying declarations.
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rejection upon the dangers to which reception would expose ordinary
jurors. It often happens, however, that an item of testimony will have a
highly and illegitimately prejudicial effect upon one issue and a substan-
tial, legitimately logical value upon another. The court then, with an
inconsistency born of necessity, assumes that the jury which has not
sufficient capacity to make the necessary discriminations upon the first
issue has the ability to perform the psychological feat of disregarding the
item entirely upon the first issue and of confining its influence to the
second issue. Nevertheless, it cannot be gainsaid that this group of ex-
clusionary decisions owes its existence and persistence largely, though not
entirely, to the jury.
But the jury cannot be charged with the slightest measure of respon-
sibility for that most senseless of all evidential rules, the rule which
forbids a party to impeach his own witness. In most matters of impeach-
ment the courts attribute to the jury very remarkable intellectual powers.
They assume that it can hear that the defendant has been convicted of
prior felonies and not be at all influenced thereby in considering his guilt
or innocence of the crime charged but will use this evidence only to aid in
determining whether he told the truth on the witness stand. They assume
also that it can be trusted to hear prior contradictory statements of the
opponent's witness and to treat them as having no probative value upon
the matter asserted but as bearing only upon the credibility of the wit-
ness. Consequently this prohibitory rule cannot be founded upon any
distrust of the jury. It must have some other explanation.
It has been thought that it is derived from trial by compurgation or
from the decisory oath of the Roman law.3° That may be so, but it is not
found in jury trial till toward the end of the Seventeenth Century. In two
criminal trials in i68i the defendant was informed that when he called
witnesses, he called them as witnesses to the truth;-3 and in 1700 in a civil
case Holt, C.J., refused to allow the plaintiff to discredit "a witness of
his own calling. ' 32 It will be remembered that these cases occurred at a
time when in civil cases the parties had for a long time enjoyed the privi-
lege of presenting evidence through witnesses and when in criminal cases
the defendant had but recently secured it. The jury still could rely upon
information which it had acquired elsewhere than in court. The witnesses
whom the parties presented were of their own selection. Nothing was
30 See 2 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 896.
31 Fitzharris's Case, 8 How. St. Tr. 223, 369, 373 (i681); Colledge's Case, 8 How. St. Tr.
549, 636 (i681).
Adams v. Arnold, 12 Mod. 375 (1700).
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more to be expected than the assumption that a party who exercised the
privilege of presenting information through a witness must see to the
reliability of his witness. The trial was taking on the aspect of a contest
between the parties, largely under the control of the parties; the witnesses
selected by the party were naturally regarded as his partisans, and not
as witnesses of the court or of the jury. And when the trial became com-
pletely adversary in character the rule forbidding impeachment remained
a logical concomitant of it, whether consciously affected by the analogy
of compurgation or not.33
What then is the conclusion of the whole matter? Our exclusionary
rules of evidence are the resultant of several factors. Ancient ideas as to
the reliability of witnesses have had their influence. judicial convictions
that the privilege of suppressing the truth is essential to the fostering of
certain socially desirable relationships and to the protection of the citizen
from persecution have played a large part. The adversary theory of liti-
gation is directly responsible for many of them; and judicial distrust of
the jury for not a few. But the dictum of the great Thayer that the English
law of evidence is "the child of the jury"34 is, it is suggested with the
greatest deference, not more than a half-truth.35
33 This explanation is suggested in Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness-New De-
velopments, 4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 69 (1936).
34 Thayer, op. cit. sutpra note i, at 47, quoted supra.
3s It is hoped that this little essay will incite some more learned writer to take issue with
its thesis and demonstrate its certain faults and probable inaccuracies. If Judge Hinton were
still with us, he would no doubt in his kindly but devastating manner make clear that, in so
far as it is not a mere jousting at windmills, it is unsound.
